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Abstract
This article explores predominant uses of theory in social 
science research in relation to the approach of phenome-
nological philosophy. While phenomenology is sometimes 
interpreted as one theoretical or methodological paradigm 
amongst others in the field of qualitative research, this 
article explores key thinkers within the philosophical tra-
dition of phenomenology to argue that this tradition can 
raise challenges for predominant conceptions of research 
and theorizing in the social sciences and certain philosoph-
ical idea(l)s that can be connected to them. The distinctive 
nature of phenomenological description is outlined, and 
new possibilities for qualitative research are sketched. Also 
considered is the question of whether qualitative research 
should seek to enshrine the intellectual virtues of the arts, 
and resist the inclination towards the scientific —and scien-
tistic— drive to theorize.
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Resumen
Este artículo explora los usos predominantes de la teoría en la 
investigación en ciencias sociales en relación con el enfoque 
de la filosofía fenomenológica. Aunque la fenomenología en 
el campo de la investigación cualitativa se interpreta en algu-
nas ocasiones como un paradigma teórico o fenomenológico 
entre otros, este artículo explora los pensadores claves de 
la tradición filosófica de la fenomenología para argumentar 
que esta tradición puede plantear retos para las concepcio-
nes predominantes de la investigación y la teorización en 
las ciencias sociales y para cierta(o)s idea(le)s filosóficos que 
pueden conectarse a ellas. Se delinea la naturaleza distin-
tiva de la descripción fenomenológica y se esbozan nuevas 
posibilidades para la investigación cualitativa. Se considera 
también el interrogante de que si la investigación cualitativa 
debería buscar consagrar las virtudes intelectuales de las ar-
tes y hacer resistencia a la inclinación del impulso científico 
-y cientificista- de teorizar
Palabras clave
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Introduction
There is something curious about the uses of “theory” in social sci-
ence research today. Part of that curiousness might be attributed to the fact 
that, on the one hand, “theory” seems to be a concept that remains largely 
under-determined in the social scientific field. Perhaps all the attention to 
methods and methodology is to blame. Swedish sociologist Richard Swed-
berg seems to suggest such a problem in his recent call for researchers 
in the social sciences to pay less attention to methods and methodology, 
and more attention to theory, and especially “the process that goes into 
the production and design of a theory” (2016, p. 5). This curiousness gets 
more curious however, when we also recognize that the concept of theory 
also appears to be, on the other hand, somewhat over-determined in social 
science research. As sociologist Monika Krause reminds us: “‘theory’ is a 
multivalent term, which means different things to different people’” (2016, 
p. 23). Theory is also, to continue in Krause’s terms, “a judgmental term, 
which is used both to value and to devalue certain kinds of work” (2016, 
p. 23). The dimension of prestige that attaches to theory that Krause indi-
cates here perhaps goes some of the way towards explaining why “theory” 
is (or why we might want it to be) a central concept within social science 
research today, despite its ambivalence. Whatever it means to attach the 
term “theory” to our findings, doing so seems a sure-fire way of giving 
those findings a particular value and weight. 
What the above works to show is that the concept of theory has a 
complex relation to social science research. Certainly, more work needs 
to be done in further spelling out this relation. In this article, I intend to 
explore this question by examining predominant conceptions of theory in 
relation to the philosophical tradition of phenomenology. Phenomenology 
is sometimes read as one theoretical or methodological paradigm amongst 
others in the field of social science. Yet here I argue that certain thinkers 
within phenomenological philosophy present a challenge to certain idea(l)s 
that can be connected to predominant conceptions of research and theo-
rizing in the social sciences. Let me clarify at the outset that my aim here is 
not to try to dismiss all theoretical offerings that social sciences have made 
over the past 150 years. Such a claim would certainly be too sweeping and 
would overlook the significant value for human understanding that have 
been opened by theoretical frameworks such as Marxism to Structuralism. 
My target here is rather on what I would call a drive to theorize within 
social science research: the misplaced move to attach value and prestige 
to the founding of theories, in ways that come to override more critical 
and productive attention to the particular. To make my argument for this, 
I will appeal to the phenomenological notion of the “background” and 
what this suggests about the relation between the human being and the 
world. Through this, I will contend, phenomenology opens onto an alter-
native conception of the task of philosophy and the philosopher, which 
resists the drive to theorize. The case for this will be made in sections (3) 
and (4). In the final section of this article, I will turn to consider whether, 
as a consequence of what has been discussed, qualitative research might 
be better off aiming to enshrine the intellectual virtues of the arts —rath-
er than acceding to inclinations towards scientistic models of inquiry.1 
1 Of course this is not to suggest that philosophical approaches are themselves be immune to 
such drives —indeed, a major feature of the arguments I will be drawing on in this paper is 
that they are seeking to react against precisely such misplaced tendencies within the philoso-
phical canon itself.
Article description | Descripción 
del artículo
This research paper derived from the pro-
ject The Ways we Think: From the Straits 
of Reason to the Possibilities of Thought, 
considers predominant uses of “theory” in 
social science research in relation to the ap-
proach of phenomenological philosophy. 
It argues that phenomenology serves to 
question certain philosophical idea(l)s that 
can be connected to predominant concep-
tions of research and theorizing in the so-
cial sciences. The article outlines a pheno-
menological approach, and seeks to show 
how this opens up new possibilities for so-
cial science research. It also considers the 
question of whether qualitative research 
should seek to enshrine the intellectual vir-
tues of the arts, and resist the inclination 
towards the scientific —and scientistic— 
drive to theorize.
Re
si
st
in
g 
th
e 
D
ri
ve
 t
o 
Th
eo
ri
se
: A
 P
he
no
m
en
ol
og
ic
al
 P
er
sp
ec
ti
ve
 o
n 
So
ci
al
 S
ci
en
ce
 R
es
ea
rc
h
m
ag
is
PÁGINA  45
The question of whether such scientistic inclinations might be observed 
in certain assumptions that shape predominant conceptions of theory 
in social science research will also be addressed in section (5). I com-
mence in section (2) with a consideration of the heritage of such ap-
proaches to theory.
Conceptions of theory
“Theory” has its etymological origins in the Latin theoria, meaning 
contemplation, and in the ancient Greek θεωρία, signifying an action of 
viewing, sight and spectacle (OUP, OED, 2017). The English word was first 
used in 1588, and derived from the French théorie, which, as well as con-
templation, had come to designate the branch of study that deals with 
contemplation and, more formally, the conceptual basis of a subject or 
area of study. In the 1600s, the term came to be used in a more specialized 
sense still, as referring to “a methodical intellectual construct… used to 
explain a great number of facts or phenomena” (OUP, OED, 2017). It is this 
weightier, explanatory sense that the concept of “theory” seems to carry 
in social science contexts today, and it is worth reflecting a little more on 
this inheritance. 
The 1600s was a time of scientific and cultural revolution. Major 
shifts were occurring in the ways human beings came to think about them-
selves, the natural world, and their relation to it. This was due, in large 
part, to the challenges to established intellectual traditions that were being 
brought about by new developments in the natural sciences, and physics 
in particular. New forms of observation and investigation meant human 
beings started to be able to quantify and measure the natural world with 
unprecedented success. As a result of the immense explanatory and pre-
dictive power of the scientific enterprise, newfound faith was placed in 
the intellectual constructs of science. Scientific theories thus came to carry 
a certain epistemic weight. Science was seen as a practice that provided 
a neutral, value-free observation of the world, and generated knowledge 
that was universal and generalizable. 
Of course, much has changed in the scientific landscape since the 
1600s. While the tradition of logical positivism in the 1920s to some extent 
enshrined the naïve view of science, at least since Thomas Kuhn’s investiga-
tion into The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), attention has been 
given to the way that frameworks of theories, concepts and rules some-
what guide scientists’ work. That is, recognition has been given to the way 
that scientists operate under a paradigm that binds their work, and all sci-
entific investigations, together. A crucial insight provided by Kuhn was that 
paradigms themselves can change – a “paradigm shift” can occur when 
the questions of scientists can no longer be answered using the accepted 
paradigm. In the field of physics, for example, such a shift occurred when 
Albert Einstein’s theories of relativity came to replace Isaac Newton’s laws 
of motion and gravitations. During such times of scientific “crisis”, Kuhn 
suggested that social forces will to some extent influence the kinds of para-
digms that are developed and which eventually come to dominance. In this 
way, the social nature of science came to be recognised. Moreover, there 
was growing awareness that the data of science might itself be dependent 
upon the theories and paradigms predominant in a particular society, at a 
particular historical time.
Kuhn’s discussion of science has wide-ranging significance. Yet one 
important upshot was that it served to remove a key barrier between 
natural science and the social sciences that had taken off during the 20th 
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Century.2 It is perhaps not too surprising, then, that 
one of the predominant ways in which the term “the-
ory” is currently utilized within the social science has 
resonances with the way scientific theory was charac-
terised by Kuhn. For when social scientists speak about 
“theory” today, it is often in relation to the notion of 
a theoretical paradigm. Moreover, such paradigms are 
also understood as ways in which the work of social 
scientists is bound together in a collective enterprise. 
The way such paradigms are at work in the social sci-
ences is, however, also somewhat different to what 
Kuhn perceived in the natural sciences. So it is worth 
us consider a little further.
Let us take Norman K. Denzin and Yvonne S. 
Lincoln’s Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (1998) as 
a representative illustration of the predominant un-
derstanding of the theoretical paradigm in social 
science. Denzin and Lincoln’s essential view of a the-
oretical paradigm is as a “net”, or an “interpretive 
framework” (p. 26). They suggest that all qualitative 
researchers work within such frameworks, due to the 
fact that “all qualitative researchers are philosophers 
in that ‘universal sense in which all human beings… 
are guided by highly abstract principles’” (p. 26). They 
identify four major interpretive paradigms (“positiv-
ist and post-positivist”, “constructivist-interpretive”, 
“critical” and “feminist post-structural”) and suggest 
that these overarching paradigms broadly structure 
qualitative research. However, they also state that 
“these four abstract paradigms become more com-
plicated at the level of concrete specific interpretive 
communities” (p. 26). They claim that theoretical 
paradigms should structure the design of qualitative 
research. They provide a table of “interpretive para-
digms” to assist researchers with this task. This table 
specifies the “criteria”, “forms” and “types of narra-
tion” that will be involved and permitted within dif-
ferent theoretical frameworks (p. 27). 
This is only a snapshot of Denzin and Lincoln’s 
account. Yet it is worth remarking on how complex 
a notion the “theoretical paradigm” turns out to be, 
even from this initial sketch. Denzin and Lincoln appear 
committed to characterizing theoretical paradigms 
as distinctively identifiable frameworks —this means 
presenting them in terms of sets of assumptions and 
“highly abstract principles” that can be articulated and 
made explicit. Such explication is assumed to be nec-
essary for qualitative research to begin on a firm foot-
ing. That is, elucidation of the theoretical paradigm 
is a way of putting the qualitative inquiry on a secure 
foundation. Yet reading through their text one may be 
forgiven for beginning to feel a little overwhelmed at 
the task that is thus to be undertaken. So many new 
2 Paul Standish (1995) provided further discussion of this point.
labels! So many sets of inter-related concepts and 
complex terms! So much specialized discourse! We 
want to be clear about matters, of course. But at what 
point does demystifying the research process give way 
to mystification?
I will return to such questions later. For now, 
however, let me move on to consider another pre-
dominant usage of the notion of theory in social sci-
ence. This relates, not so much to what begins of the 
research process as its results. For the term “theory” 
is often employed in the social sciences to refer to a 
particular kind of intellectual construct. At this point, 
it may be helpful to re-invoke Swedberg’s discussion of 
theory and theorizing in the social sciences. For in his 
account of what it is to produce a theory, Swedberg 
works with such an understanding. As he exemplifies 
(2016, p. 5): 
You start out by observing in an attempt to get a 
good empirical grip on the topic before any theo-
ry is introduced. Once this has been done, it may 
be time to name the phenomenon; and either turn 
the name into a concept as the next step or bring in 
some existing concepts in an attempt to get a handle 
on the topic. At this stage, one can also try to make 
sense of analogies, metaphors, and perhaps a typol-
ogy, in an attempt to both give body to the theory 
and to invest it with some process. The last element 
in theorizing is to come up with an explanation… 
before having been properly tested against empirical 
material, according to the rules of the scientific com-
munity, the theory should be considered unproven.
Swedberg’s picture helps to bring out the way 
that, in this sense, “theory” aims at producing a thesis 
that has some explanatory power. That is, a “theory” 
captures something about the social world. It thus 
plays something of an integrating role —it serves to 
incorporate data and findings and organize them into 
a coherent and consistent framework.
One of the key upshots of this conception of 
theory is that social scientific research is construed as 
producing results that can themselves be further test-
ed —proved or disproved by further research. Simon 
Glendinning brings out this dimension in his descrip-
tion of “constructive” theoretical work (2007 p. 15):
Constructive theorizing is centrally characterized by 
the effort to advance a thesis. Making use of rec-
ognised research methods and often building on the 
work of others, one seeks to develop a convincing ra-
tionale for a particular position on some topic (some-
thing which might then be further explored, debated 
and tested) a position which could be made public 
as the ‘outcome’ or ‘result’ of one’s research activity.
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Of course, producing “outcomes” in the form 
of “theories” that can be tested is itself a hallmark of 
research in the natural sciences. This returns us to the 
point made at the outset of this article regarding the 
value and prestige that has come to be attached to 
what is designated as a “theory” in research today. 
Perhaps we might add a further dimension here and 
say that such value is connected to the idea that social 
science produces theories that can be tested. Indeed, 
on this basis we get the idea that the theories of social 
science provide some generalized explanations of the 
world that can be tested. They are therefore seen to be 
of use —to policy makers, to non-academic audiences, 
as well as to their research community as a whole.
Phenomenological backgrounds
We have now seen two predominant conceptions 
of theory that are at work in the field of social science 
research today. At this point, I want to turn to phe-
nomenology, and start to consider the sorts of opposi-
tion this tradition might make to such conceptions. As 
has been noted, phenomenology is sometimes read as 
one kind of theoretical or methodological framework 
amongst others in the social sciences. Yet my claim is 
that the potential scope of the critique drawn from 
phenomenology extends to assumptions that inform 
precisely such a reading. To understand why, I first 
need to say a little more about the phenomenological 
tradition. It is important to recognise from the out-
set here that phenomenology is itself not a monolith: 
there are competing perspectives to be found within 
the phenomenological canon itself. In what follows I 
do not intend to give a complete picture of ‘phenom-
enology’ as a philosophical approach. I rather aim to 
sketch certain lines of connections between thinkers 
who, I would suggest, are especially pertinent to the 
task of showing why there might be a need to re-in-
terrogate the role of theory within qualitative research.
In philosophy, the term “phenomenology” is of-
ten used to stand for a philosophical revolution that 
was instigated by the work of the German thinker Ed-
mund Husserl. Husserl envisaged phenomenology as a 
discipline distinct from traditional approaches in epis-
temology (which had previously dominated the philo-
sophical scene) and “dogmatic science.” For Husserl, 
previous approaches to knowing had been immersed 
within what he called the “natural attitude”: the as-
sumption that the world is something continuously 
and factually “on hand” (vorhanden), and the result-
ing preoccupation with discovering whether a sub-
ject’s experiences correspond to the way the natural 
world objectively is —and thus with questions of jus-
tification, truth and veridicality (Husserl, 1983 [1913], 
§ 27-30). Husserl’s concern was that, with the focus 
on questions of truth, knowledge and justification, 
thinkers adopting the “natural attitude” were failing 
to consider a key aspect —viz. that “whatever physical 
thing are… they are as experienceable physical things” 
(§ 47). What Husserl thinks the natural attitude has 
overlooked, more specifically, is the mode of givenness 
of our experience: the way our experiences are given 
as they are given. Husserl conceived phenomenology 
as the study of precisely this sphere: phenomenolog-
ical philosophy was to be a project of doing justice 
to the “lived experience” of consciousness (erlebnisse). 
Husserl represents the beginnings of phenom-
enological philosophy, but the tradition that sub-
sequently arose came to take his initial insights in 
directions that extended far beyond those of his own 
work. Husserl’s approach was arguably still orientated 
towards providing a conceptual foundation for what 
human beings know. Later phenomenologists came to 
move beyond this more epistemological focus. Never-
theless, it can be said that what is characteristic of a 
number of subsequent ‘phenomenological’ approach-
es are their commitments to this broader Husserlian 
notion of doing justice to what is given in experience 
as it is given. As David Wood puts it (2002, p. 33), 
this phenomenological approach might be generally 
characterised as the “imperative of staying with expe-
rience, acknowledging experience” (Wood, 2002, p. 
33). On one level, this might sound rather simple. Yet, 
as thinkers who follow this imperative exemplify, it has 
critical consequences for the ways we understand the 
human being, the world, and our relation to it.
To see how, I want to turn at this point to the 
phenomenological account, not of Husserl, but rather 
his student, Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s philosophy 
serves as a useful entry point to the kind of position I 
am seeking to develop here.3 In particular, I should like 
to invoke Heidegger’s distinction in Being and Time 
between two ways in which human beings encoun-
ter things in the world: as present-to-hand (vorhan-
denheit) and as ready-to-hand (zuhandenheit) (2005 
[1927], p. 97). For Heidegger, the former represents 
a contemplative, theoretical mode of understanding 
(like the detached observation of a thing as an object), 
which has been foregrounded by philosophers. The 
latter, however, refers us to the ways we encounter 
things in our everyday dealings with the world —for 
example, the way the hammer becomes a tool to drive 
a nail into a wall when I want to hang up a picture. 
3 It is worth noting that Heidegger’s philosophy is a key reference 
point for a number of subsequent philosophers who took up the 
phenomenological project such as Jean Paul Sartre, Emmanuel 
Levinas and Jacques Derrida. I explore the distinctness of Heide-
gger’s philosophy in terms of its developments and its limitations 
regarding a re-description of the human being and the human re-
lation to the world in The Ways We Think (Williams, 2016a).
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Crucially, Heidegger argues that this latter, engaged relation to things in 
the world is more originary. To understand why, we need to further consid-
er what is at stake in encountering something as zuhandenheit.
For Heidegger, things in the world show up for us in this mode in 
terms of “equipment” —that is, as things that might be used “in order 
to…”. Now, Heidegger questions, what makes it possible things to show 
up for us like this in the first place? Why is it that I happen to relate to a 
hammer as something that I can use “in-order-to” drive a nail into a wall? 
Here, Heidegger makes a crucial move. For he claims that this kind of en-
counter will itself presuppose a familiarity with the hammer. Put otherwise, 
it presupposes familiarity with a matrix of involvements, cultural meanings 
and significances, which I inherit and which constitute the hammer’s be-
ing what it is for me. Indeed, Heidegger argues that I could not come to 
apprehend the hammer as a tool for driving a nail into a wall without such 
structures —my inheritance of them is a precondition for my being able to 
encounter the hammer as I do in the first place. 
Of course, what Heidegger is suggesting here is not supposed to 
be confined only to things like hammers. Rather, by paying careful atten-
tion to the nature of zuhandenheit, Heidegger works to reveal something 
about the conditions of possibility of human beings’ relating to the world 
more generally. Human beings, Heidegger argues, are always already are 
engaged and involved with the world. Our thinking, as Heidegger puts it, 
takes place within a ‘background’ —a world of cultural objects with histor-
ical meanings that have come down to us from the past and are used in the 
present for the sake of future goals. Hence, our thinking is always already 
imbricated in a web of significances. It is in this sense that zuhandenheit 
is a more originary mode of relating to the world. We do not occupy a 
neutral or disengaged standpoint —as though we first perceived objects 
and then went on to take them “as” something (for example as a house, 
or a car, or whatever). Rather we approach things with what Heidegger 
calls “fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception” —we are continually 
caught up in a circle of interpretation by and through our dealings with the 
world (2005 [1927], p. 191).
Notably, through this, Heidegger was going against the grain of 
much philosophical thinking at that time. For philosophy, and especially 
the philosophical tradition of epistemology, had tended to prioritize the 
detached and contemplative relation to objects.4 The point is not merely 
that Heidegger shifted the emphasis. For, crucially, following Heidegger’s 
discussion of the conditions of thinking, detached contemplation comes 
to itself be understood as a kind of praxis —as a way of thinking that is 
determined by its own mood and circumspection. “We are”, as Charles 
Taylor puts it “always and inevitably thinking within … taken-as-there 
frameworks” (2013, p. 75). This holds as much for our states of detached 
contemplation as for our engaged dealings with the world.5
In his recent retrieval of the Heideggerian-type position, Charles Tay-
lor has drawn upon the kinds of account sketched above to suggest that 
Heidegger’s philosophy takes us in the direction of a kind of holism: the 
view that, “our particulate awarenesses, our grasp on particular things, are 
4  I further explore the kinds of opposition to the epistemological tradition that can be drawn 
from phenomenology, and Heidegger’s philosophy in particular (Williams, 2014).
5 As Heidegger puts it, a contemplative grasp of the thing “has sense only on the basis of an 
already-being-involved-with”, and is thus itself “a founded way of being-in-the-world, a way 
which is always possible only on the basis of a non-cognitive comportment” (Heidegger, 1992 
[1925], p. 162-164, emphasis in the original). 
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embedded in a more general framework, which gives 
them their sense” (2013, p. 77). Crucially, as Taylor 
also points out, following Heidegger’s account, such 
frameworks remain largely non-articulated and inex-
plicit —and essentially so. This is because the human 
embeddedness is a complex and multifaceted affair 
—it incorporates historical, contextual, and social ele-
ments— which cannot all spelled out at once. This, in 
turn, has crucial consequences for the way the task of 
the philosopher is to be understood. As Taylor puts it, 
“some or other such framework will always be there, 
making sense of what we do” hence we can “never 
get to the bottom”: “the number of things a… philo-
sophical mind could raise questions about is indefinite, 
endless” (p. 75). This is not, let us be clear, and expres-
sion of scepticism. It is not the claim that, for certain 
contingent, reasons we might be able to articulate the 
background. Rather, the insight is meant to challenge 
the very project of trying to articulate the background 
in full. As Taylor puts it, “this kind of foundational am-
bition is vain”, since “where and when we are form 
part of the framework of our lives, in relation to which 
we go about the things we’re doing, including the 
things we question and argue about” (p. 75). 
Phenomenological descriptions 
I have now explained some of the ways in which 
the phenomenological project works to re-interpret 
the nature of the human being and their relation to 
the world. We have also seen that this involves, es-
sentially and not just contingently, an opposition to a 
foundational project that would seek to fully articulate 
the background that conditions our thinking. Yet it is 
worth going further. For we want to know what kind 
of task remains for the philosopher following this ac-
count. Indeed it is from here that, as I will argue, new 
possibilities for social science research can be opened. 
In his In the Name of Phenomenology, Simon 
Glendinning (2007) works to develop a picture of 
the distinctive phenomenological approach, which it 
will be useful to build on here.6 Glendinning’s char-
acterization of phenomenology comes as a result of 
his reading of certain philosophical thinkers including 
Heidegger and Husserl. Yet Glendinning’s characteri-
sation also allows for the possibility that the insights 
of the phenomenological thinkers I am drawing on 
here might be further connected with work in other 
traditions of philosophy —traditions that do not con-
ventionally fall under the label of phenomenology. I 
shall turn to consider this point a little later. Let me 
6 Glendinning’s account outlines five aspects of the phenomenolo-
gical approach, but in what follows I have slightly re-characterized 
these to present four features.
firstly draw on Glendinning’s characterisation to spell 
out, more particularly, the specific kind of aims that 
these forms of phenomenological inquiry have, as well 
as the particular ways in which they works to achieve 
those aims.
Regarding aims, the first point Glendinning 
makes is a negative one. That is, on this reading, a 
phenomenological approach will not seek to develop a 
thesis (2007, p. 14-15). As Glendinning explains, “phe-
nomenological research does not have in view the de-
fense of a ‘position’ in the sense of something which 
could be carried away with one independently of the 
work of words in which such summary fragments 
might be formulated” (p. 15, emphasis in the original). 
We should not misinterpret this to mean that phenom-
enology does not aim at providing any insights —such 
a claim would be absurd. But the point here is that the 
kinds of insights that flow from the phenomenological 
philosopher are not like any “results” that can be sum-
marized in sound-bite form and transferred to a num-
ber of contexts. A number of historical examples from 
the phenomenological field attest to this. We might 
think, for example, of Jean-Paul Sartre’s wariness of 
the way his ideas came to be encapsulated by his Ex-
istentialism is a Humanism lecture, or of Jacques Der-
rida’s continual efforts to work with new words and 
new themes so as to resist the translation of his ideas 
into easily repeatable concepts or theories.7 Indeed, as 
Glendinning suggests, when such attempts have been 
made to characterize the insights of phenomenology 
(and perhaps we might here think about the way that 
the “theoretical framework” or “methodology” of 
phenomenology is sometimes summarized in hand-
books on social science research), this often happens 
at the expense of the richer picture than has been un-
folded within the phenomenological literature.
Secondly, and relatedly, on this reading phenom-
enology aims at “description, not explanation or anal-
ysis” (p. 16). That is, phenomenological philosophers 
often interpret their studies, not in terms of the dis-
covery of some new theory or knowledge, but rather 
as the attempt to unfold more fully something we al-
ready know but have forgotten or overlooked. Heide-
gger for example saw phenomenological philosophy 
as a means of describing a form of knowledge that he 
characterized as being “closest” to us as human be-
ings. For Heidegger, however, this form of knowledge 
7 Sartre’s expresses his resistance to the kind of abstracting and 
theorizing of his ideas in his early novel Nausea (1933, p. 101):
 And then, about forty, they baptize their stubborn little ideas and 
a few proverbs with the name of Experience, they begin to imitate 
slot machines; put a coin in the slot on the left and out come anec-
dotes wrapped in silver paper; put a coin in the slot on the right 
and you get precious pieces of advice which stick to our teeth like 
soft caramels.
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needed “recovery” insofar as it had been obscured by contemporary ways 
of thinking and understanding the world (particularly by modern science). 
Thus, as Heidegger saw it, phenomenological descriptions were not aimed 
at advancing some new kind of knowledge that can be simply be add-
ed on to the contemporary scene. Rather, it was orientated towards a 
kind of “leap” —out of familiar landscapes of knowing, but crucially onto 
“that soil upon which we really stand” (Heidegger, 2004 [1954], p. 41). As 
Glendinning points out, this is not to say that phenomenology does not 
invent new concepts. The distinctiveness of its approach, however, comes 
in what these concepts are put to work for: “in phenomenology what such 
conceptual innovation aims at is not a work of theoretical explanation but, 
essentially, an effort or activity of elucidation” (Glendinning, 2007, p. 16, 
emphasis in the original).
It is important to understand what is at stake in elucidation carefully. 
For, by claiming that phenomenology is oriented in its purpose towards 
‘description’ and ‘elucidation’, it could seem that the purpose of this kind 
of approach is simply to draw out our immediate or intuitive relations with 
the world, rather than something more substantial. Yet this would be a 
misunderstanding. For it would miss the powerful nature of the elucida-
tion phenomenology aims towards, and how this enables us to gain more 
insight than an explanation would allow for. One way in which we can see 
this is by re-invoking Heidegger’s elucidation of everyday things such as a 
hammer as ‘ready to hand.’ What Heidegger’s account reveals here is not 
just our immediate understanding of something like a hammer. Rather, his 
description works to open up the rich and multi-layered possibilities within 
the hammer —and connected to this, the ways in which a thing like a ham-
mer opens onto wider values and practices and that are part of the ways 
of being of humans who are engaged using such tools as they live our their 
lives. The elucidation of the hammer as a tool used ‘in order to’ drive a nail 
into a wall, for example, opens onto the ways human beings use hammers 
to hang up pictures, and also how they might use it to fix a doorframe as 
part of a house or of a church and so forth. This elucidation of the hammer 
can be said to bring into view more broadly human practices of building, 
of dwelling, of worshipping. The picture of human existence opened up 
by Heidegger’s attention to the hammer is thus far richer than the kind of 
account we could get through an ‘explanation’ of a hammer —that is, an 
account that would tend towards an objective and neutral depiction of the 
hammer as an object, abstracted from its role in human life.
The phenomenological approach, via elucidation, can thus be char-
acterized as an attempt to look at the world anew: to re-orientate one’s 
vision (p. 17). As Heidegger put it, his teacher Husserl gave him “the eyes 
with which to see”. Heidegger’s wording here is suggestive, not only of 
the way Husserl conceived the phenomenological project as a revelatory 
way of doing philosophy, but also the way a phenomenological approach 
involves a new revelation of the human world itself. 
This leads onto a final characteristic of phenomenological philos-
ophy that I should like to highlight here. Glendinning characterizes this 
in terms of phenomenology’s apparent lack of explicit arguments (p. 22). 
As Glendinning explains it, phenomenology wants to resist emulating the 
“plain speaking” of science (p. 22). Why should such a resistance be im-
portant to the phenomenological project? It is not just a stylistic matter. 
The particular way of developing arguments and insights that phenome-
nology enshrines follows directly from its re-configuration of the human 
being and its relation to the world, as considered above. For, indeed, once 
we take the point that our thinking about the world will always take place 
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from within certain frameworks and contexts that, essentially and not just 
contingently, cannot be fully elucidated and articled, then it follows that 
the aim of a phenomenological enquiry cannot be to seek to somehow 
get “behind” experience and offer explicit theoretical justifications for the 
kinds of responses and judgments we make as human beings. This is not 
to say, crucially, that we cannot offer any arguments or advance any claims. 
What phenomenology is hereby rejecting is not argument itself. Rather, 
it is setting up an opposition to false ideas of what arguments might in-
volve, and what they amount to. However “plain speaking” our argument 
might be, and however logical, it will never work to produce a picture of 
the world as it really is. For indeed, to borrow Stephen Mulhall’s (2008) 
phrasing “which way is that”? We are always thinking within frameworks 
and with particular inheritances that cannot be fully cashed out in terms 
articulated propositions and assumptions. This is not to endorse a version 
of relativism. Rather it is to expose the exorbitant requirements that are so 
often attributed to notions of objectivity (including as the idea(l) that we 
might be able to adopt and achieve a the ‘view from nowhere’). That is, it 
is to expose as problematic and damaging the denial of the very conditions 
that make it possible for us to know and think in the first place. And it is 
to show that our thinking about such conditions, and about our modes 
of being themselves, require a more subtle understanding than the false 
drives to objectivity can allow for.
I should like at this point to cross over to the work of Ludwig Witt-
genstein. To some, this might seem like a strange turn, given the previous 
discussion has focused predominantly on thinkers who are more classically 
acknowledged as being part of the phenomenological philosophical can-
on. However, part of the argument I should like to offer in this paper is the 
claim that the phenomenological perspective I amoutlining is not one that 
is restricted only to those thinkers embedded within the classical tradition. 
On this point, I follow Glendinning and others in seeing a phenomenologi-
cal approach as also being discernable in the tradition of ordinary language 
philosophy.8 This can especially be seen from the way, for example, certain 
ordinary language philosophers were concerned with examining what is 
at stake in specific examples of our uses of particular words and phrases 
within everyday life (phrases such as ‘I promise’, or notions such as ‘games’ 
for example), rather than seeking to produce grand scale theories of lan-
guage. Wittgenstein is a notable example of this approach, a point that 
is developed by Paul Standish in his paper Why We Should Not Speak of 
an Educational Science. In this paper, Standish suggests that Wittgenstein 
opposed the philosophical inclinations to theory and theorizing with the 
notion of Übersicht —that is, with the formation of a “perspicuous repre-
sentation or overview” (1995, p. 273).9 For Wittgenstein, the task of the 
philosopher is thus to be moved away from the attempt to provide grand-
scale explanations that are thought to un-problematically map onto the 
8 Of course, ordinary language philosophy, like phenomenology, is not a monolithic tradition. 
Yet arguments have been made for seeing a connection between the approaches of certain 
phenomenological thinkers, particularly Heidegger, and the work of ordinary language philo-
sophers who had less systematic ambitions, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and John L. Austin. 
Simon Glendinning makes a case for this in his introduction to In the Name of Phenomeno-
logy, other influential arguments for these connections have been to have been advanced 
by Charles Taylor (1997) and Stephen Mulhall (2001). In the philosophy of education, Paul 
Standish defends this connection in his Beyond the Self (1992). I have also explored the 
connections between certain thinkers in the phenomenological tradition and those in the 
ordinary language tradition in my The Ways we Think (2016).
9 Like Gilbert Ryle, Ludwig Wittgenstein is more usually positioned within the Ordinary Langua-
ge Philosophy tradition, yet the overlaps of this with phenomenology are worth bringing out.
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6
way the world actually is. What philosophy should aim 
for, by contrast, is a careful description or perspicuous 
survey of a limited segment of practice. 
We can see such a view exemplified in Wittgen-
stein’s own exploration of language and meaning. As 
Standish puts it, what Wittgenstein was after was a 
“clear view of the use of our words” —achieved by 
means of an “extensive, piecemeal, grammatical ex-
ploration of the psychology of concepts” (p. 275). 
Crucially, as Wittgenstein works to demonstrate, such 
an oversight is not achieved by means of abstracting 
words from their uses in specific concrete practices (a 
move that often happens in connection with a proj-
ect of grand-scale theorizing, because here we would 
not be content with saying something only about how 
words are used in one context —indeed, the desire 
here is to say something apparently more “profound”, 
and explain the meaning of words in all contexts). 
For Wittgenstein, rather, Übersicht is gained from a 
careful exploration of particular contexts of language 
use —or what he terms “language games.” And a key 
feature of language games for Wittgenstein is their 
incommensurability. The criterion for the correct us-
age of words is bounded by the language game it-
self. Yet this is not to say that the project of describing 
the usage of words is a simple affair. As Standish also 
points out, what Wittgenstein’s investigations are 
interested in are not only phenomena but also, in a 
way that might be compared to Heidegger, the pos-
sibilities of the phenomena: the range of projections 
and responses that might be appropriate. Such pos-
sibilities can never be fully stated or revealed —hence 
we return to the resistance to foundationalism, and to 
the sense that understanding is achieved via subtler 
means. As Standish explains it (p. 274):
The Übersicht is in keeping with the holistic charac-
ter of Wittgenstein’s thought. It is not an exhaustive 
explanation; it is necessarily partial, covering a lim-
ited domain of our experience or a limited segment 
of grammar. The “craving for generality”… with its 
contemptuous attitude towards the particular case, 
is to be resisted and the Übersicht is set against any 
ideal of an over-arching theory.
There is much more that could be said here. But 
perhaps what has been suggested here does enough 
to demonstrate the kinds of approaches that phe-
nomenology —understood in the sense I have been 
exploring here— opens. Perhaps it also works to show 
the ways in which a phenomenological approach can 
oppose certain conceptions —of the aims, ends and 
efforts of research— that seemed to work alongside 
the predominant approaches to theory outlined at the 
start of this article. But let me unfold this more slowly.
From Science to Art
Earlier in this article, I considered two predom-
inant understandings of “theory” in social science 
research. These related, more specifically, to concep-
tions of “theoretical paradigms” which are taken as 
a key starting point of qualitative inquiry and also to 
theoretical constructive work, which can be seen as 
the “outcome” or “results” of qualitative inquiry. What 
I would like to claim now is that we can draw chal-
lenges to both directions from the phenomenological 
approach. 
Firstly, and regarding “theoretical paradigms” it 
can be said that phenomenology calls into question 
the idea that such frameworks are, or can be, well 
understood in terms of statements or commitments 
that can be articulated and made explicit in abstract 
and intellectual terms. For phenomenology, there is 
an essential —and not just contingent— inexplicitness 
within the background that conditions human think-
ing. Not everything can be shown all at once. Perhaps 
this will feel unsatisfactory to some. Yet it is worth 
reminding ourselves here of the particular way expli-
cation of such “theoretical paradigms” often tends to 
go. What the phenomenological approach allows us 
to consider is that such a practice is something of an 
unnecessary over-intellectualization. Far from demysti-
fying the background to thinking, then, such practice 
rather seems to embroil us in mystification.
This feeds into the kinds of opposition drawn 
from phenomenology that can be leveled against the 
second predominant use of theory in social science 
—viz. “theory building”. As I have suggested above, 
the approaches to phenomenology that I have drawn 
on here would resist the construction of explanations 
that can be made to work universally, across a num-
ber of domains. They would also would resist the drive 
to large-scale integrating accounts.10 This is not to 
say that phenomenology takes us towards a narrow 
position of relativism. In fact, phenomenology would 
certainly suggest that there is something to be gained 
by the exploration of overlaps, connections and dis-
connections between different contexts and different 
studies. Crucially, however, phenomenology would 
want to say that such comparisons are illuminating in 
themselves —not because they might take us towards 
some grander, all-encompassing explanation (such as 
the uncovering of some underlying laws). While the 
10 As I have stated, I am here drawing on particular thinkers within 
the phenomenological tradition, but this tradition itself is not mo-
nolith. There are different strands and traditions of thinkers within 
the broader category of ‘phenomenology’, and not all these would 
endorse the viewpoints I have drawn on here. Alternative pheno-
menological position to the approaches I draw on here have been 
developed, for example, by Amedeo Giorgi here, see Giorgi (1997).
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notion of “theory building” in social science research is often taken to be 
a hallmark of its rigour and its value, then, following a phenomenologi-
cal argument we might say that the imposed consistency and uniformity 
that theorizing brings rather works to preclude rigorous thinking insofar as 
such generalizing tendencies disincline us towards the particular. Yet it is 
only through attention to the particular and the concrete that things come 
to be understood by human beings in the first place.
I should also like to go a little further with the argument at this point. 
For we might want to consider whether certain wider philosophical com-
mitments stand behind the conceptions of theory I outlined at the start 
of this article —and whether phenomenology might also bring us to chal-
lenges these. It will only be possible to offer an indication of these here. 
Yet let us consider, for one, just why it is that one might come to be in-
clined to give explicit and articulated “theoretical paradigms” for the field 
of social science. Could this be because, in doing so, the work of social 
scientist comes to emulate the work of the natural scientist who, as we 
noted above via our discussion of Kuhn, will also work within paradigms 
and frameworks shared by the scientific community. Let us, furthermore, 
consider why it might be that one becomes inclined towards seeing the-
oretical work in terms of the metaphors of laying foundations and, else-
where, in terms of constructing and building. Could it be that because, 
in doing so, we further help to enshrine the idea that social science seem 
more of a unified and collective enterprise, which is on its way towards dis-
covering a truth that will be shared by all? Yet behind inclinations there lies 
an assumed idea(l). That is, there lies a presumed valuation of the natural 
scientific model as the most reliable way of going on. Perhaps, given the 
immense explanatory power that natural science seems to possess, such a 
presumption is not unjustified. And perhaps in terms of the way that fund-
ing for research in the social sciences today seems to be distributed, such a 
presumption cannot easily be resisted.
Nevertheless, as the phenomenological arguments rehearsed in this 
article work to show, science itself enshrines a particular way of thinking. 
More particularly, science is committed to a particular set of values and 
commitments regarding, for example, the nature of scholarship, of rigor-
ous inquiry, and of valuable knowledge. The unquestionable acceptance of 
science as the rule has come to be known as “scientistic”. The question for 
those wishing to resist the allure of science is: where might we go instead?
One area within social sciences that would seem to naturally come 
into contact with the directions I am opening here would be arts-based 
research. However, perhaps we might attempt a broader move here and 
consider whether my phenomenologically based approach might open 
a connection between the social sciences, and the field of the arts and 
humanities. Indeed, I would contend that the kind of phenomenological 
approach I have sketched in this paper in many ways has more in common 
with ways of thinking and researching found in the arts rather than in the 
sciences.11 If we take the field of literature as an example, an argument 
could be made that the best kinds of inquiry in this field do not devel-
op along the lines of a foundationalist or construction-based model, but 
rather enact a kind of circling round a topic or text —describing, revisiting 
and questioning in ways which are not aimed at uncovering a fixed and 
completed “understanding” but rather at opening up new ways of think-
11 As Paul Standish (1995) highlights, it was observed by David Pears that Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophical method has more in common with arts than science “because the nuances of 
particular cases are not caught in any theory” (p. 272).
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ing and kinds of imaginative insight. To give an exam-
ple of this, we might consider the ways of thinking that 
would be appropriate for approaching a Shakespeare 
text. I go on to give an example below of Hamlet and 
Coriolanus. Now, Shakespeare creates multifaceted 
characters that keep us guessing about the elusive 
nature of their psychic identities. This is evident from 
the way Shakespeare’s characters have been portrayed 
in performances in a multiplicity of ways and from 
how, throughout his plays, our judgements about key 
characters are often interrupted and disturbed (think 
of Hamlet’s perpetual questioning, for instance, or 
the way in which characters in Coriolanus constantly 
debate the principle protagonist’s character). In this 
way, it can be claimed that Shakespeare’s plays create 
the space for endless debate, interpretation and rein-
terpretation of the characters and their motives. The 
appropriate response to such openness, ambivalence 
and indeterminacy seems thus to be to ‘circle’ the text: 
not impatiently reaching after a final theory that neatly 
summarises everything, but rather seeking to look and 
look again —to open up avenues for interpretation 
and new perspectives.12
It is perhaps worth adding here that the term 
“theory”, while used in the field of literature, has been 
the subject of much debate and opposition in itself.13 
Part of the concern here, in a way that is again some-
what like the opposition I have been developing in this 
paper, is not so much with theory itself (with engaging 
in discussions of notions like ideology; deconstruction; 
psychoanalysis for example), as with false conceptions 
of theory which lead to misapplications. Things go 
wrong when literary interpretation takes its cue from 
large-scale frameworks in ways that overlook and 
often obscure the specificities and the particularities 
of singular texts. Such (mis)uses of theory, can be re-
sisted, however. To do so, we need to recognise that, 
as Jonathan Culler (1997, p. 16) puts it, “to admit the 
importance of theory is to make an open ended-com-
mitment, to leave yourself in a position where there 
are always important things you don’t know” —but, 
as Culler also adds, “this is the condition of life itself.”14
12 I further explore resonances between phenomenological approa-
ches and literature in Williams (2016b). 
13 See, for example, Terry Eagleton, After Theory (2003). As Eagleton 
remarked in an interview about this work (Jarvis & Oakley-Brown, 
2004, p. 188):
 Where theory bites is for people for whom it isn’t an option… 
it’s when you need it, when it’s not just a hat you can put on, 
or an option you can choose academically, that you begin to see 
something of a meaning in it, I think. But we can’t tell the tune 
on how that happens.
14 Culler provides an insightful account of theorizing in literature, 
which is sensitive to similar issues regarding theory we have been 
discussing here. As Culler explains (p. 17):
Conclusion
What conclusions can be drawn from all of this? 
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this pa-
per has not been to reject theoretical offerings in 
general. However, my point has been to show up the 
problems that can emerge when the drive to theorize 
is taken too far. To this end, the article has sought to 
demonstrate the kinds of oppositions to predominant 
uses of “theory” in social science research raised by 
certain thinkers who can be seen as part of the tra-
dition of phenomenological philosophy. It has been 
seen that these take the form of, on the one hand, 
misconstruals of the nature of the “theoretical frame-
work” and, on the other hand, a resistance to the 
idea(l) of constructing large-scale integrating expla-
nations. Furthermore, through phenomenology, it 
has also been questioned whether behind the current 
conceptions of theory in social science, there might 
lurk a draw towards scientism. It has been argued 
that a phenomenological approach that foregrounds 
holism, careful description and attention to the par-
ticular, might embody an approach that comes closer 
to the arts than the sciences. The extent to which the 
social sciences should become more aligned with the 
procedures and practices of the arts and humanities 
is a question that lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
Yet perhaps important barriers are removed, for both 
fields, once certain false ideas of theory have been 
overcome. I would argue that these traditions within 
phenomenological philosophy helps us on the way 
to this. Phenomenology can enable us to rediscov-
er the significance and the meaning in the particular 
—the achievement in the piecemeal rather than the 
desire for large scale systematizing. The success of 
the phenomenological approach is thus that it serves 
to “replace explanation and analysis with description 
without leaving us yearning for something more” 
(Glendinning, 2008, p. 26).
 Theory makes you desire mastery: you hope that theoretical rea-
ding will give you the concepts to organize and understand the 
phenomena that concern you. But theory makes mastery impos-
sible, not only because there is always more to know, but, more 
specifically, and more painfully, because theory is itself the ques-
tioning of presumed results and the assumptions on which they 
are based. The nature of theory is to undo, through a contesting 
of premises and postulates, what you thought you knew, so the 
effects of theory are not predictable. You have not become mas-
ter, but neither are you where you were before. You reflect on 
your reading in new ways. You have different questions to ask 
and a better sense of the implications of the questions you put to 
works you read. 
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